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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the effects of a carbon tax, one of the possible
instruments for reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Such taxes are
currently being proposed as a means of reducing CO2 emissions, motivated by
concerns about the global greenhouse effect and its potential impact on global
climate and sea levels (Cline, 1991) and on global economies (Nordhaus, 1991).
We therefore take as our problem the reduction of CO2 emissions by the UK
economy by use of a carbon tax, and the corresponding effect of this tax on the
purchasing power and economic behaviour of households.
If they were introduced, carbon taxes would affect the price of fossil fuels in
the UK, and thus UK consumer prices, both directly for fuels and indirectly for
manufactured goods. These price changes would in turn affect the level and
structure of UK final demand, and it is this post-tax UK final demand which will
determine UK fossil fuel use, and thus CO2 emissions. In particular, we
investigate the social effects of a carbon tax, by considering the distribution of
the increased tax burden across consumers.
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Our analysis is in four stages. First, we use an input–output framework to
assess the likely impact of carbon taxes on fossil fuels upon the prices of
consumer goods. Second, these price changes are used as inputs to the IFS
Simulation Program for Indirect Taxation (SPIT), to estimate the effects on
consumer demand. Third, the structure of estimated consumer demand allows
estimates of fossil fuel use, and thus CO2 emissions, to be calculated. Finally, the
distributional implications of this tax incidence are analysed.
Various levels of carbon tax are used in the simulations, and the impacts of
this tax on government revenue and consumer welfare are also assessed.
Particular attention is paid to the achievement of a 20 per cent reduction in CO2
emissions attributable to consumer demand, in line with the ‘Toronto target’.
This target is combined with a range of other tax and benefit reforms, aimed at
reducing the inequities in distribution brought about by a simple carbon tax.
II. THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND THE CARBON TAX
Recent research into the Earth’s climate suggests that the release of ‘greenhouse
gases’, particularly CO2, into the atmosphere is likely to cause major and
potentially irreversible changes in global climate by the year 2050 (e.g. Bolin,
Doos, Jager and Warrick, 1986). It seems that although a substantial increase in
the concentration of atmospheric CO2 is unavoidable over the next few decades,
there may exist possibilities for limiting this increase by the adoption of suitable
economic and technological policies on a global scale (e.g. Svennigsson, 1985).
If the rate of CO2 emissions is to be reduced, the level and mix of fossil fuel
use will need to be altered substantially to reduce the carbon intensity of fuel
production and use. One approach is to levy a carbon tax on fossil fuels, with the
tax proportionate to the carbon content of the fuel. For example, a tonne of hard
coal contains about 1.4 times as much carbon as a tonne of oil, so the tax on coal
should be 1.4 times as high per tonne as that on oil. Pearce (1991) has surveyed
the recent literature on the likely effects of carbon taxes. Further important
recent contributions are by Barker and Lewney (1991), on the macroeconomic
modelling of environmental policies, and Sondheimer (1991), specifically on the
macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes. A comprehensive survey of the long-run
macroeconomic consequences of greenhouse gas abatement is given by Boero,
Clarke and Winters (1991).
In this paper we concentrate on the effects of a carbon tax on income
distribution and government revenue. Recent literature in this area includes
Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990), who consider the additional tax burden
generated by a selection of possible taxes on consumer spending and its
distribution across households. Poterba (1991) has estimated the distributional
effects of a carbon tax for the US, using both current and life-cycle concepts of
income. Scott (1992) has estimated the distributional impact of a carbon tax inCarbon Taxes
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Ireland. Smith (1992) has made estimates of the distributional impact of the
proposed carbon tax in six EU Member States.
None of the above studies is ‘behavioural’, in the sense that none attempts to
account for consumers’ response to the altered absolute and relative prices of
commodities brought about by a carbon tax. Also, none of these studies takes
account of the effects of a carbon tax on the prices of non-fuel household
purchases, even though about half of all fuel use and CO2 emissions are
associated with the production of goods by industrial activity.
A study that does use an input–output approach, thus taking account of the
effects of a fuel tax on non-fuel purchases, is that by Casler and Rafiqui (1993).
However, their analysis does not allow for the effect of behavioural responses to
the tax incidence on consumer behaviour.
Pearson and Smith (1991) have made a study of the effects of a carbon tax on
household behaviour (i.e. a behavioural study), but only taking account of the
increased price of domestic fuels, not other purchases.
In contrast to the above literature, the present study offers a behavioural
analysis of the effects of a carbon tax, which also takes account of the effects of
such a tax on the prices of non-fuel goods purchased by households. As far as we
are aware, this is the first study that seeks to examine the effects of carbon taxes
on household behaviour in such a comprehensive way.
III. THE INPUT–OUTPUT FRAMEWORK FOR MODELLING THE
EFFECTS OF CARBON TAXES
To examine the scope for implementing such a carbon tax in the UK, one needs a
modelling framework for how fossil fuels are used in an economy. Such an
approach would need to distinguish between the ‘direct consumption demand’
for fossil fuels and the ‘indirect consumption demand’. For example, households
purchase fuels for direct use (e.g. petrol, heating oil, coal, gas); this constitutes
direct consumption demand. They also purchase goods the production of which
has entailed the use of fossil fuels (e.g. a motor car has entailed large amounts of
fossil fuel use in its manufacture); this constitutes indirect consumption demand.
The indirect consumption demand for fossil fuels can be identified with the
derived demand for these fuels through production; thus we may identify the
indirect consumption demand with the ‘production demand’ for fossil fuels.
This production demand can be further subdivided into ‘direct production
demand’ and ‘indirect production demand’. For example, the manufacture of a
motor car requires fossil fuel use directly, mainly for space heating and process
heating within car manufacturing establishments. This is the direct production
demand. However, much fossil fuel is expended in the manufacture of the steel,
glass, plastics, electricity etc. used as inputs to the car-making process. This is
the indirect production demand.Fiscal Studies
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Our analysis therefore seeks to identify the demand for fossil fuels by
producing sector and by fuel, and decomposed into the direct consumption
demand, the direct production demand and the indirect production demand. This
effectively imputes all fossil fuel use to final demand. Thus the ‘carbon
requirement’ per unit output of each sector could be calculated, and similarly so
could the CO2 emissions. The most appropriate tool for such a sectoral analysis
and decomposition is input–output analysis. The details of the calculation of the
direct consumption demand and production demand for fossil fuels are given in
Gay and Proops (1993) and Proops, Faber and Wagenhals (1993, Chs 6–8).
IV. CARBON TAXES AND CONSUMER DEMAND
The increased production costs caused by a carbon tax will be passed on, to a
greater or lesser extent, to the consumer in terms of price increases, the size of
which will depend on how much of each fossil fuel is attributable to the
manufacture of each type of good. We make the usual input–output assumption
that, in the short and even medium run, there is no substitution of fuels in
production. This assumption of zero elasticities of substitution between the
various fuels, and between fuels and other inputs, means that the price rises
calculated will be considerably greater than those where such substitution is
allowed in the longer run. The estimates we produce for the price effects of
carbon taxes will therefore be akin to upper bounds on the effects that will be
observed.
The total CO2 emissions by an economy can be attributed to total final
demand for goods and services (i.e. to disaggregated national product). This
methodology is described in Gay and Proops (1993). This final demand can be
further disaggregated into demands by consumers, by government, for exports
and for the accumulation of stocks and capital goods. This study concentrates on
the effects of consumer demand on CO2 emissions by the UK. (The effect of UK
consumer demand on CO2 emissions overseas is not assessed in this study. For a
discussion of this problem, see Proops, Faber and Wagenhals (1993, Ch. 8).)
In the UK, consumer demand accounts for approximately 50 per cent of
national product (at factor cost) and approximately 55 per cent of CO2 emissions
(directly and indirectly). Therefore, in this study we shall be examining the
possibility of using a carbon tax to achieve a 20 per cent reduction in CO2
emissions for roughly half of national product and a little over half of total UK
CO2 emissions.Carbon Taxes
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V. THE CARBON TAX RATES COMPARED WITH THOSE IN OTHER
STUDIES
As discussed above, in this study we concentrate on the effects of carbon taxes
on consumer behaviour. Our methodology is therefore rather confining, in that it
allows substitution between goods by consumers, but not between fuels or
techniques by producers. As a result, while one would expect to see a long-run
effect of a carbon tax on manufacturing (Proops, Faber and Wagenhals, 1993,
Ch. 11), with consequent long-run reductions in CO2 emissions, we take no
account of this considerable abatement possibility in our essentially static study.
As a result, to achieve a reduction of approximately 20 per cent in direct and
indirect CO2 emissions by households (ignoring the other elements of final
demand), the lowest carbon tax we find necessary (Reform 1) is £240.5 per
tonne (i.e. $411 per tonne). When revenue neutrality and equity considerations
are taken into account (Reform 5), the necessary carbon tax is very high indeed
(£444 per tonne; i.e. $755 per tonne).
It is useful to compare the carbon tax rates we use with those in the literature,
where long-run substitution in production is allowed for. In his review, Pearce
(1991) noted a range of estimates for a carbon tax producing a (generally long-
run) reduction of CO2 emissions of about 20 per cent for the UK. In increasing
order of tax level, these include: $34–59 per tonne (Barrett, 1990); $87–205 per
tonne (Ingham and Ulph, 1989); and $145–516 per tonne (Barker and Lewney,
1991).
Estimates for approximately 20 per cent CO2 reduction by other countries
included the following: $82 per tonne — US (Chandler and Nicholls, 1990);
$100 per tonne — US (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983); $113 per tonne — US
(Congressional Budget Office, 1991); $126 per tonne — Norway (Bye, Bye and
Lorentsen, 1989); $300 per tonne — US (Manne and Richels, 1989).
We note that our lowest required carbon tax rate is less than the higher
estimate of Barker and Lewney (1991), although our highest required tax
exceeds all the quoted estimates. We therefore offer our analysis not as a means
of estimating the appropriate level of carbon tax, for the reasons discussed
above, but as an illustration of the revenue and distributional implications of
carbon taxation, when consumer responses to the resulting price rises are taken
into account.
VI. THE SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
This section outlines the micro-simulation routine that investigates the impact of
carbon taxes on aggregate government revenue, on CO2 emissions and its
sources, and on household expenditure, and the distribution of these effects
across the economy. The simulation routine uses a demand system that isFiscal Studies
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estimated from pooled Family Expenditure Surveys (FESs) for the years 1970–
86, a sample of 116,000 households.
A carbon tax will increase the price of most goods and may involve large
changes in relative prices. This will cause substantial changes in consumer
expenditure that cannot adequately be forecast by simple models that use
constant price elasticities. The model used here predicts the response of each
household within the 1986 survey — a sample of 7,045 households — to the
imposition of a carbon tax. The taxes and prices relating to August 1990 are
taken as the base system, household income being reflated to this period. The
demand system underlying the simulation routine is an extension of the Almost
Ideal Demand System model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and allows
expenditure on specific commodity groups to depend on both the price of that
group and the relative price of other groups, together with household
characteristics.
The simulation program used here incorporates models for different types of
household according to the classifications smokers/non-smokers and car-owners/
non-car-owners. It covers nine commodity groups (food, alcohol, household
energy, clothing, transport, services, petrol, tobacco and other goods) which
form 80 per cent of total consumer household expenditure. The two other
components of household expenditure — durables and housing — are treated as
commodities that are ‘fixed’ or ‘rationed’ by quantity. If the price of any
component of the rationed goods changes, then expenditure on them will change
by the same proportion. Hence it is assumed that households will maintain the
real value of the rationed goods purchased. Expenditure on the rationed goods is
evaluated under the new prices, the remaining income being distributed between
the remaining nine groups according to the demand system predictions.
The predictions are used to compute government revenue and CO2 emissions
on the assumption that taxes are entirely incident on consumer prices. The SPIT
model is described in detail in Baker, McKay and Symons (1990). It has already
been used by Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) and Pearson and Smith (1991)
to investigate the distributive consequences of increased indirect taxes on
domestic energy, petrol and food. However, as noted above, their analysis did
not take account of the major indirect effect of a carbon tax on the prices of all
goods, through the increased direct and indirect manufacturing costs resulting
from a carbon tax on all fossil fuels.
The FES contains information on expenditure for a fine breakdown of goods,
and total expenditure is aggregated into approximately 39 categories of goods
that are encompassed by the 11 broad groups. Using UK input–output tables
(Central Statistical Office, 1987) and data on UK inland energy consumption
(Department of Energy, 1989), CO2 intensities were calculated for the 39 FES
goods categories.
The units used for these intensities are kg CO2/£ (at 1990 market prices). This
use of kg CO2/£ rather than kg carbon/£ makes obvious the relationship betweenCarbon Taxes
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changes in consumer demand resulting from any tax and the altered CO2
emissions. However, the literature on carbon taxes generally considers the tax to
be upon the carbon content of the fuels, rather than the resulting CO2 emissions.
For consistency with this literature, we specify our carbon taxes in £/tonne ofFiscal Studies
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carbon.
The CO2 intensity for each group of goods is given in Table 1. All figures
relate to the amount of CO2 produced for each pound of expenditure, at 1990
expenditure levels. Column 1 gives the CO2 intensity relating to consumption of
the fossil fuel; column 2 relates to the CO2 produced directly in production;
column 3 relates to indirect production. The final column is the sum of the
component parts.
For car fuel the CO2 intensity is determined largely by consumption. The
goods that have a significant production element are energy and public transport
(with emissions directly in their production) and transport repair, personal
services and china (with contribution indirectly through their production). Note
that household energy consumption is treated as a single good, so there is no
substitutability in consumption between gas, electricity, coal and other fuel
sources. The inclusion of separate energy categories in the demand system
caused problems of robustness in estimation. This is an area for future work.
From the table we see that each pound of consumer expenditure on public
transport generates 1.27kg of CO2. Under our assumptions, the impact of a
carbon tax on public transport would reflect the pollutant value of both the direct
use of public transport by consumers and the indirect effect caused in the
consumption, and thus production, of other goods; in other words, it will be
proportional to the CO2 intensity of the good.
Thus
tik = α  cik
where  tik is the incidence of the carbon tax on the kth good within the ith
commodity group, α  is the equivalent tax on CO2 emissions (£/kg) and cik is the
CO2 intensity for good ik.
The price indices for the broad commodity groups are taken from the
published monthly retail price index series. The imposition of carbon taxes, or
any change to the overall effective indirect tax rates on individual goods, is
translated into price changes for the broad commodity groups, as the weighted
sum of the percentage price changes of goods within each group; thus for the ith
group,
(i=1,…,13)
where Pi is the price index for the ith commodity group, pik is the price index of
good ik and wik is the proportion of expenditure on the ith group spent on good
ik. The superscripts 0 and 1 indicate pre- and post-tax change respectively. We
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changes. This corresponds to the method of construction of the retail price
indices used in estimation.
The simulation program adopts a relatively simple procedure for ‘grossing
up’ expenditure levels to the national level. The shortfall is corrected by
multiplying FES expenditure data by the ratio of National Accounts consumer
expenditure to FES expenditure for each commodity group. This yields
‘corrected’ tax revenue and levels of CO2 emissions.
VII. THE IMPACT OF CARBON TAXES
This section considers some implications of introducing a carbon tax. As we
assume that such a tax would ultimately be entirely incident on final consumers,
we can model a carbon tax as a set of indirect taxes on consumer goods, the
effective indirect tax depending on the level of the underlying carbon tax on
fuels and the CO2 intensity of the goods consumed. Therefore, we first examine
possible carbon- tax-induced effective indirect tax systems that will reduce CO2
emissions from the consumption sector by approximately 20 per cent, the target
suggested at the 1988 Toronto conference.
Such reforms substantially increase government revenue, so we subsequently
consider ways this revenue can be used to maintain revenue neutrality by altering
other aspects of the tax system, either direct or indirect. We then consider a tax
system that reduces CO2 emissions by almost 20 per cent but does not increase
government revenue. We compare the alternative potential policies with respect
to their effect on different types of household. When considering government
revenue neutrality, we are particularly concerned with the use of policies that
have direct effects on real income distribution.
Carbon Taxes, and Tax and Benefit Reforms Considered
In more detail, the reforms we consider are shown in Table 2.
Reform 1 is a simple carbon tax, with no other tax or benefit alterations. The
carbon tax is set at a level that reduces CO2 emissions attributable to household
consumption of goods, including fuels, by approximately 20 per cent.
Reform 2 aims to achieve approximately the same reduction in CO2 emissions
as Reform 1, without any increase in the price of petrol. The carbon tax is higher
than in Reform 1, and the petrol excise duty is more than halved from its present
level.
Reform 3 maintains the carbon tax of Reform 2, but to seek to maintain
neutrality of government revenue, VAT is removed. There is a smaller reduction
of CO2 emissions than in Reforms 1 and 2.
All of the above reforms have severely regressive effects on income
distribution. Therefore, in Reform 4 the neutrality of government income is
approximately maintained by adjustments to various benefit payments, ratherFiscal Studies
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than VAT abolition. This gives rise to a reduction of CO2 emissions of little
more than half the Toronto target.
Reform 5 seeks to combine the revenue neutrality of Reforms 3 and 4 with
the Toronto target reductions in CO2 emissions from Reforms 1 and 2, as well as
seeking to counter the regressive effects of the carbon tax, through benefits
adjustment. The CO2 emissions reduction is still slightly below the Toronto
target.
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS
Using the SPIT model, with Reform 1 we estimate that the carbon tax required to
reduce UK CO2 emissions attributable to consumers by approximately 20 per
cent is £240.5 per tonne of carbon. For Reform 2, the necessary tax rate is
£277.5 per tonne of carbon. As mentioned above, both of these figures are high
compared with most estimates found in the literature for carbon taxes that would
achieve the Toronto target. Again we stress that this is because of the assumption
of no substitution in production.
Table 3 shows the percentage price change for goods with high CO2 intensity.
Each reform involves a large change in relative prices. Household fuel and petrol
prices rise much more than prices for other goods in Reform 1, because of their
very high CO2 intensity. Amongst the remaining groups, the prices of china etc.,
food and transport show relatively high increases.Carbon Taxes
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Table 4 gives the corresponding average weekly expenditure for households
within the sample. The behaviour patterns are much as expected, with
expenditure on household fuel increasing for both reforms, although not by as
much as the price, indicating a fall in the quantity consumed. Expenditure on
most other goods falls or remains fairly constant. Expenditure on petrol increases
for Reform 1, but falls when the excise duty is reduced, due to cross-price effectsFiscal Studies
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on demand. This table relates to the FES sample underlying the simulation
routine, and does not allow for the unrepresentative nature of the FES sample.
Table 5 shows the national government revenue generated by the carbon
taxes and aggregate CO2 emissions when the results from the sample have been
corrected for the unrepresentative nature of the FES. Both reforms give an
approximately 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions, but also increase
government revenue from indirect taxes by approximately 47 per cent (i.e. £16
billion).
Table 6 breaks down the total reduction in CO2 emissions from the
consumption of the CO2-intensive goods: petrol, household fuel and transport.
The expenditure predictions indicate a large reduction in consumption of
household fuel and petrol, due to the relatively large price increases in these
goods. Also shown are the consequent total reductions in CO2 emissions.Carbon Taxes
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1. The Distributional Effects of Carbon Taxes
The greatest virtue of working with data at the household level is that it
facilitates a comprehensive distributional analysis of the effects of tax changes.
It is possible to break down the impact of the carbon tax rate changes for
different parts of the income distribution. We measure ‘welfare’ by total
expenditure less the indirect tax payments (including the incidence of the carbon
tax). That is, we use expenditure measured at factor cost, rather than market
price. This we will denote as ‘disposable expenditure’, and use as a measure of
household welfare.
FIGURE 1
Change in Disposable Expenditure by Decile: Reforms 1 and 2
Key:  Reform 1. Carbon tax achieving Toronto target.
Reform 2. Carbon tax, plus reduction in petrol excise duty, achieving Toronto target.
Figure 1 shows the average proportionate changes in disposable expenditure
for members of each decile, where households have been ranked by pre-reform
disposable expenditure. Disposable expenditure has clearly fallen most for those
at the bottom of the income distribution in both reforms. However, Reform 1 is
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The drawback of Figure 1 is that it only tells us about the difference in the
means of each decile group and not what is happening within each decile. The
Atkinson and Gini inequality indices capture the change that all households
experience.
2 In Table 7 we present computed inequality indices on disposable
expenditure for pre- and post-reform distributions. It shows that the effect of the
carbon tax on disposable expenditure becomes more unequal at all levels of
inequality aversion, more so for Reform 2 than Reform 1, as would be expected
given Figure 1.
2. Comparing the Fuel and the Total Carbon Tax Effects
As noted above, one can estimate the effects of a carbon tax on household
behaviour taking account only of the corresponding increased price of domestic
fuels. To illustrate the importance of taking account of the total effect of a
carbon tax, including the effect on the prices of manufactured (non-fuel) goods,
we have estimated the impact of the fuel part of the tax separately. In Table 8 we
compare the changes in expenditure on various categories of goods for a
(carbon) tax on household fuels only and for the same tax rate impacting
(indirectly) on all goods. We use the carbon tax rate for Reform 1 and alter no
other aspects of the tax and benefits system.
We see that while the fuels-only effect of the carbon tax on the purchase of
fuels is an increase in expenditure of 16 per cent, when the full effect of the tax
is taken into account, the increase in expenditure is 32 per cent. There are also
large differences with regard to changes in expenditure on most other categories,
except food and clothing. We conclude that ignoring the impact of a carbon tax
on non-fuel purchases by households will give a very distorted picture of the full
effects of a carbon tax on consumer behaviour.
                                                                                                                                   




Reforms 1 and 2, discussed above, raise substantial tax revenues. There are
many potentially beneficial policies that the Government could pursue to reduce
CO2 emissions through expenditure on goods and services: for example,
construction of fuel-efficient plants, clean-up of electricity-generating plants,
installation of energy-efficient appliances in housing and industry, and
incentives for substitution to less fuel-intensive household durables. An
important possible policy, which would reduce CO2 emissions and be beneficial
to low-income households, would be subsidised home insulation. For a
discussion of the possibly great impact such measures might have on CO2
emissions, see Jackson and Jacobs (1991). Here we do not consider such direct
measures. A main advantage of indirect taxation is that it provides the correct
price signal and incentive to combat externalities by individuals’ and firms’
behaviour. We consider uses for the revenue raised that reduce the adverse
inequality effects of the carbon tax outlined in the previous section.
One possible way to maintain a revenue-neutral policy is to alter the
distribution of indirect taxes towards CO2-intensive goods. The carbon tax could
replace the proportional VAT that currently operates. Table 9 shows the
estimated percentage change in prices that would result from a reform using a
CO2 tax of 7.5p per kilogram and a petrol excise of 45p per gallon, with a VATFiscal Studies
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rate of zero, denoted Reform 3 in the tables. Comparing this with Reform 2 in
Table 3, we see that the price of household energy has increased proportionately
more than that of the other goods, since it is currently zero-rated for VAT.
Similarly, the price of food has fallen much less than other prices, since the CO2
tax is applied to all food but VAT affects only a small amount. Thus we expect
the change in expenditure to be greater for households with higher income
levels, which are able to substitute away from these relatively expensive goods
more easily.
An alternative way to generate a revenue-neutral reform would be to return
the increased revenue via the direct tax system. An obvious way of reducing
income inequality would be to target the revenue at poorer households: for
example, pensioners, low-income households and those with children. Reform 4
is a revenue-neutral change, which sets a minimum weekly expenditure per adult
of £55, increases benefit to pensioner households by £7 per pensioner and to
households with children by £7 per child, while maintaining the CO2 tax at 7.5p
per kilogram and petrol excise at 45p per gallon. VAT is kept at 15 per cent. The
benefit reforms proposed represent a minimum income guarantee to cover
necessary living expenses, approximately equating to the benefits in force in
1990. Thus those households that are affected most in terms of welfare by the
high price of necessities (namely, fuel and food) are compensated by increases in
income.
The price changes from Reform 4 are the same as those from Reform 2, but
we expect expenditures to change more since there is an additional income effect
for some households in the sample. This is confirmed in Table 10, which shows
the average weekly expenditure for Reforms 3 and 4. Expenditure on household
energy increases less for Reform 3, as the other goods become relatively
attractive. Despite this, the fall in other prices causes the quantity of goods
purchased to increase, so the reduction in CO2 is much less than for Reforms 1Carbon Taxes
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and 2. Under Reform 4, the change in the household energy expenditure is
greater — 54 per cent, which compares with 39 per cent in Reform 2 — despite
the 91 per cent increase in price. Here, total expenditure has increased for poorer
households, where household energy is a necessity.
Table 11 summarises the aggregate effect of Reforms 3 and 4. The reforms
reduce CO2 emissions by 11–15 per cent while leaving revenue from indirect
taxation approximately unaltered from the base case. his is an important finding,
as it suggests that even when aggregate income is maintained, a carbon tax,
through altered relative prices, will still give rise to a considerable reduction in
CO2 emissions.
Table 12 shows how the reduction in CO2 emissions is distributed across the
goods. Comparing this with Table 6, we see that for Reform 3 the reduction in
CO2 emissions from household energy is unchanged, but the reduction for
transport and petrol is smaller, because the price decrease causes households to
purchase more of these goods. Reform 4 has a smaller overall reduction in CO2
emissions, since total expenditure is higher, but the reduction in emissions from
petrol is greater, due to the relative price differences between the two reforms.Fiscal Studies
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The Distributional Effects of Carbon Taxes
Since food and household energy are necessities for poorer households (they
command a high share of expenditure), the distributional effects on welfare of
Reform 3 could be very severe. Figure 2 shows the average proportionate change
in disposable expenditure for members of each decile, where households have
been ranked into deciles of the pre-reform disposable expenditure distribution.
This reform is much more regressive than those of the previous section. Reform
4 will have more favourable distributive effects, as shown in Figure 2. The
poorer households in the sample have a substantial increase in total expenditure,
which more than compensates them for the increased tax rates.Carbon Taxes
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These results are reflected in the Atkinson inequality indices given in Table
13. Reform 3 shows a large increase in inequality, larger than for Reforms 1 and
2, while Reform 4 shows a large fall in inequality at all levels of inequality
aversion.
FIGURE 2
Change in Disposable Expenditure by Decile: Reforms 3 and 4
Key: Reform 3. Carbon tax, plus reduction in petrol excise duty, plus zero VAT.
Reform 4. Carbon tax, plus reduction in petrol excise duty, plus benefits reform.
X. TORONTO TARGET AND REVENUE NEUTRALITY
The reforms considered in the two previous sections illustrate two polar cases.
Reforms 1 and 2 concentrated on reducing CO2 emissions and ignored
government revenue and the redistributive effect of tax reform on households.
Reforms 3 and 4 gave more attention to the tax revenue generated and to the
increased income inequality which may be created. This section addresses both



















approximately 20 per cent while having neither a sizeable impact on government
revenue nor a detrimental effect on household income distribution.
Reform 5, which is now presented, is revenue neutral and allows for benefit
adjustments on equity grounds. However, it involves a much higher carbon tax
rate (£444 per tonne) to ensure the necessary reduction in CO2 emissions. The
parameters of the tax systems for Reform 5 are given in Table 2, while the
expected effect on consumer prices is given in Table 14. The very high carbon
tax results in a very high price increase for household energy, since there is no
completely offsetting reduction in VAT or excise duty. The macroeconomic
effects and possible implications for labour demand and supply are ignored.
Table 15 gives the predicted average weekly expenditure for households
under Reform 5. The reforms entail an increase in total expenditure of £20 per
week, resulting from the increase in benefit payments. This causes a substantialCarbon Taxes
39
increase in expenditure on household energy, but a 33 per cent reduction in
quantity purchased and a consequent reduction in CO2 emissions.
The overall effects of Reform 5, on CO2 emissions and government revenue,Fiscal Studies
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are shown in Table 16.
Under Reform 5 there is a 20 per cent increase in the price of petrol and only
a 3.4 per cent increase in expenditure. This results in a reduction of 13.7 per cent
in quantity, and hence corresponding CO2 emissions, as shown in Table 17.
Overall, Reform 5 yields reductions in CO2 emissions of 17.8 per cent and is
approximately revenue neutral.
The distributional impact of Reform 5 is determined by considering which
households gain most from the average increase in total expenditure. Figure 3
shows the percentage change in disposable expenditure for deciles of pre-reform
disposable expenditure. The bottom two deciles gain from the reforms, whilst the
other households all lose approximately 5 per cent of disposable expenditure, so
Reform 5 reduces the regressiveness of the current indirect tax system.
The inequality of disposable expenditure is reduced, as shown in Table 18.Carbon Taxes
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FIGURE 3
Change in Disposable Expenditure by Decile: Reform 5
Key: Reform 5. Carbon tax, plus reduction in petrol excise duty plus benefits reform, approximately
achieving Toronto target.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper illustrates the effects of introducing carbon taxes on the pattern of
consumer demand, and thus production, in the economy. A carbon tax is
imposed on fuels under the assumption of its complete incidence on final
demand (including consumers). This is equivalent to an indirect tax reflecting
the CO2 intensity of consumer goods; thus goods that generate much CO2
emission in production (directly and indirectly) will be taxed relatively heavily.
This is in addition to the impact of the carbon tax through the direct sale of fuel
to consumers. The level of CO2 emissions for categories of consumption goods is
evaluated within an input–output framework.
There are large increases in the price of some commodities, notably
household energy, petrol, china, transport and, to a lesser extent, food. The price
increases of the first two commodities are due primarily to the direct consumer



















the goods for consumers. The carbon tax that reduces the UK CO2 emissions
attributable to consumer demand by 20 per cent generates a 47 per cent increase
in government revenue from indirect taxes and has dramatic adverse
distributional effects for low- income households within the economy.
Reforms are also considered that attempt to offset these distributional effects
by increasing benefit payments to low earners. These result in a rather lower
reduction in CO2 emissions, but have positive redistributive effects in terms of
welfare. It is important to note that our revenue-neutral tax reforms (i.e. where
the carbon tax revenues are recycled) still give rise to considerable reductions in
CO2 emissions.
We finally consider possible tax and benefit systems that reduce CO2
emissions but maintain revenue neutrality and attempt to offset the adverse
distributional effects of the carbon tax. This reform results in a very substantially
larger carbon tax but a reduction in other indirect taxes, leaving many prices
almost unchanged. The exception to this is a large increase in the price of
household energy. Low- income households are compensated by the increase in
benefits which results in a higher disposable expenditure.
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